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Introduction
Quine’s naturalistic approach to epistemology,1 emphasizing 
the role of scientific methods, has both initiated and strengthened 
many analogical ideas in different disciplines. Consequently, 
contemporary philosophers discuss not only the appropriateness 
of ideas posed by the American thinker in the field of study of 
knowledge, but also in metaphysics, ethics, esthetics, philosophy 
of language and anthropology, among others. One can easily be 
led to the opinion shared by great number of philosophers ac-
cording to which these disciplines can no longer be effectively de-
veloped without taking into consideration the knowledge gained 
due to the progress in the empirical sciences and psychology. As 
a result, evolutionary psychology has become a relevant part of 
ethics,2 neurosciences help to formulate theories from the field 
of esthetics,3 cognitive linguistics (especially cognitive metaphor 
1 W. van Orman Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, [in:] Ontological Relativity 
and Other Essays, New York 1969, pp. 69–90.
2 See, for instance: M. Slote, Ethics Naturalized, “Philosophical Perspectives” 
vol. 6 (1992), pp. 355–376.
3 See, for instance S. Brown et. al., Naturalizing Aesthetics: Brain Areas for 
Aesthetic Appraisal Across Sensory Modalities, “NeuroImage” 58 (2011), pp. 250–
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theory) are a crucial part of reflections involving the genesis and 
nature of language,4 primatology helps anthropologists to under-
stand human nature5 and physical theories are indispensable in 
contemporary metaphysical discussions.6 All this illustrates the 
role of science in many dimensions of the contemporary philo-
sophical discourse. 
It does not imply, however, that the methods of scientific 
theories’ application in the philosophical disciplines are clear and 
uncontroversial. Instead, the present situation is the complete 
opposite. The case of epistemology and discussions concerning 
Quine’s idea are appropriate examples of such difficulties.
The real authority science is endued in philosophical debates 
also causes legal theorists and philosophers to be interested in 
the naturalistic approach to the problems of jurisprudence, both 
philosophical and practical.7 It does not mean, however, that it is 
possible to describe a coherent and widely acceptable model of such 
a “naturalization of law.”
The problems linked to this term are numerous. The basic 
objection is as follows: the character of law is, generally, norma-
tive. “Legal systems” (whatever this term means) contain mainly 
prescriptive expressions, and this fact may seem to be prima facie 
the justification of the separationist view in the discussion on 
possibility of naturalization. Statements of science are generally of 
a descriptive character since they may be evaluated as irrelevant 
for law. However, such a position would be naïve. There is no norm 
without statements describing the elements of reality, creating 
either a worse or better view of the world.
This conclusion may lead to at least two means of interpretation.
258.
4 G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metaphors we Live by, Chicago 1980.
5 P. S. Rodman, Peter S. Whither Primatology? The Place of Primates in Con­
temporary Anthropology, „Annual Review of Anthropology” 10 (1999), pp. 311–339.
6 T. Bigaj, Ungrounded Dispositions in Quantum Mechanics, “Foundations of 
Science” 17 (2012) 3, pp. 205–221.
7 See, for instance: R. Allen, B. Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law 
of Evidence, „Virginia Law Review” 87 (2001) 8, p. 1503.
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Pragmatic and realistic suggestions, which have been present-
ed by the representatives of various legal traditions, lead legal 
theory to focus on the facts relevant from the perspective of the 
functioning of the law. Hence, the first philosophical models of 
the naturalization may be interpreted from the output of legal 
realists, particularly from the American realist tradition, Scandi-
navian school or Leon Petrażycki, a notable Polish scholar in legal 
philosophy. These days, however, such models may be evaluated 
as being out of date, mainly due to methodological regards.
Therefore, there is a need for different interpretations of what 
exactly it means “to naturalize” the law. The attempt to under-
stand the role of the natural sciences in jurisprudence from other 
perspectives is the proposition of the interpretation of natural-
ization as a grade of the logical conformity between descriptive 
presuppositions of legal norms and actual knowledge concerning 
the relevant issues.8 Although the advantages of such a way of 
explanation are numerous (and it is doubtless more adequate), 
it also raises numerous problems chiefly regarding the nature of 
this “conformity” and the choice of scientific theories that may be 
considered sufficiently confirmed to be the basis for norms, which 
are to be in force in the state.
Regardless of the detailed ideas formulated by the repre-
sentatives of legal theory and philosophy, the fact of existing 
similarities concerning the interpretation of naturalized epis­
temology and naturalized law itself is worth noticing. It may 
serve as a kind of orderliness of different problems concerning 
the “naturalization of law” in both of the aforementioned forms. 
This aim will be achieved by the presentation of three interpre-
tations of “naturalization of epistemology” project, as described 
by Susan Haack.9 The main thesis of this paper is that Haack’s 
8 See: B. Brożek, O naturalizacji prawa (On the naturalization of law), [in:] 
Naturalizm prawniczy. Interpretacje, red. J. Stelmach et. al., Warszawa 2015, 
s. 24–47.
9 S. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry. Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, 
Cambridge (MA) 1993.
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interpretations can be applied (by analogy) to the interpretation 
of “naturalization of law”. 
Of course, the big question concerning the character of natural-
ization will be answered merely partially. Nevertheless, even such 
analysis seems to be relevant, especially due to the discounting of 
possible interpretations of “naturalized epistemology” other than 
simple replacement by legal philosophers who try to naturalize the 
law similarly as Quine attempted to change epistemology.
It behooves to begin with presentation of Quine’s naturalistic 
project and its main proposals, which can be found in his famous 
paper “Naturalized Epistemology”. 
1. Quine’s naturalistic approach in epistemology
1.1. Critique of positivistic foundationalism
One of main issues discussed by Quine is the critical approach 
to logical positivism, especially his rejection of analytic/synthetic 
distinction and the possibility of empirical foundationalism. The 
latter issue is particularly relevant because it is one of main causes 
of Quine’s negation of the value of “classical” epistemology and is 
also one of the crucial issues canvassed in twentieth century.
Quine briefly recapitulates the thesis of Rudolf Carnap (and 
other prominent representatives of logical positivism) referring to 
his book Die logische Aufbau der Welt.10 In his opinion, the project 
of the eponymous Aufbau was the best attempt at executing the 
classical (traditional) project of epistemology founded on basic 
observatory sentences (protokolare Saetze).11 These expressions, 
which are reports from sensory experience, were to be the foun-
dation of science. Quine argues that if it were possible to realize 
Carnap’s project, it would allow us to express sentences concerning 
the world in the terms of perceptual data and logic (and set theory). 
10 W. van O. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, op. cit., p. 74.
11 W. van O. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, op. cit., p. 74.
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Unfortunately, the failure of Carnap’s program is a fact and the 
most important objection, known since Hume famously criticized 
the induction, is as follows: there is no theory that can be logically 
deduced from observation. The fact that a sentence is expressed 
in the terms of observation and logic does not imply that it can be 
proved on the basis of Protokolarsaetze and logic.12 Such founda-
tional epistemology cannot guarantee epistemologically valuable 
theories.
It is doubtful whether such an objection is sufficient for the 
rejection of “classical” epistemology, as made by Quine. Consider-
ing this fact, one should note his understanding of epistemology 
is radically narrow and not adequate in the historical context. 
The fact relevant in the context of his naturalistic project is the 
opinion that the natural sciences (sensu largo) are crucial from the 
epistemological view if we want to avoid the return of “Carthesian 
foundationalism”. Quine’s approach is prima facie simple substi-
tution of classical epistemology, but, as will be posed below, such 
interpretation is not the only one possible, and perhaps not the 
most appropriate, especially in the context of making use of simi-
lar, naturalistic methodologies in legal philosophy.
1.2. Interpretations of “naturalized epistemology”  
as presented by Susan Haack
Although the impression and first interpretation of the Quine’s 
paper may be that his main idea is a simple replacement, the case 
is more sophisticated.13 After Quine’s paper was published, many 
philosophers have expressed their own interpretations concern-
ing the character of “naturalization”. One of the famous papers 
was published by Jaegwon Kim,14 who formulated an important 
12 W. van O. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, op. cit., p. 74.
13 See: R. Ziemińska, Zwrot naturalistyczny we współczesnej epistemologii, 
„Filo -Sofja” 1 (2001), p. 307.
14 J. Kim, What is “Naturalized Epistemology?, “Philosophical Perspectives” 
Vol. 2 (1988), pp. 381–405.
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position in the discussions regarding the validity of the simple re-
placement of epistemology by psychology. Kim asserted that such 
replacement was inadequate mainly due to normative character 
of epistemology which, in his opinion, disappears when psychol-
ogy becomes epistemology – radical naturalized epistem ology is 
then purged of all normativity;15 therefore, such a reduction of 
a traditionally normative discipline to a purely descriptive one is 
unacceptable for him. Although the problem of the normativity 
of epistemology will not be discussed in the present paper, Kim’s 
position may not be evaluated as fully sound due to some other 
factors, mainly because it presupposes a radical interpretation of 
Quine’s program. Therefore, there is a need to consider a different 
way of interpreting Quine. In the present paper, I will focus on 
the interpretation presented by Susan Haack. The reason why is 
that her ways of understanding of epistemology naturalization 
are a good basis for the interpretation of the “naturalization of 
law” in spite of many evident differences between law and epis-
temology.
In Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction of Epistem­
ology, Haack has pointed out the main interpretations of the nat-
uralistic turn in epistemology in the light of Quine’s essay, which, 
in her opinion, are all consistent with Quine’s main idea.16 She 
enumerated the following:17
1) an extension of the term 'epistemology' to refer not only to the 
philosophical theory of knowledge, but also to natural-scientific studies 
of cognition;
2) the proposal that epistemology be reconstructed as the philo-
sophical component of a joint enterprise with the cognitive sciences, 
in which the questions about human knowledge tackled by philosophy 
15 J. Kim, What is “Naturalized Epistemology?, op. cit., p. 391.
16 S. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, op. cit., p. 130.
17 Similar interpretation may be found in: R. Almeder, On Naturalizing Episte­
mology, [in:] Knowledge and Inquiry: Readings in Epistemology, ed. K. Brad Wray, 
Orchard Park (NY) 2002, p. 261.
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will be extended to include new problem areas suggested by natural- 
scientific work;
3) the thesis that traditional problems of epistemology can be re-
solved a posteriori, within the web of empirical belief;
3') the thesis that results from the cognitive sciences may be rele-
vant to and may legitimately be used in the resolution of traditional 
epistemological problems;
[(a) – all the traditional problems;
(b) – some of the traditional problems]; 
4) the thesis that traditional problems of epistemology can be re-
solved by the natural sciences of cognition;
[(a) – all the traditional problems;
(b) – some of the traditional problems];
5) the thesis that the traditional problems of epistemology are 
illegitimate or misconceived, and should be abandoned, to be replaced 
by natural-scientific questions about human cognition;
[(a) – all the traditional problems;
(b) – some of the traditional problems].18
These six possibilities do not only signalize the troubles philo-
soph ers encounter when trying to explain the character of episte-
mology naturalized but, generally, show the possible difficulties in 
the process of the application of scientific theories to other fields of 
human intellectual activity. 
The first and second interpretations are quite obvious nowadays 
and are realized as contemporary influential cognitive science. Phi-
losophy, and especially epistemology, is perceived as the important 
part of this multidisciplinary project.
To certain extent, it is related to the third way, according to 
which traditional epistemological problems can be rethought 
a posteriori (and perhaps resolved) through results from empirical 
sciences; consequently, scientific theories may be relevant from the 
point of view of the philosophical analysis of epistemological issues. 
18 S. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, op. cit., p. 118–119.
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Such a statement may be treated as a declaration of science 
utility in philosophy. Of course, epistemology still remains philo-
soph ical discipline in that kind of naturalization, and saves the 
methodological autonomy. Therefore, such a position may be called 
moderate and partial naturalization (or, as Haack calls it, “reform-
ist, aposteriorist naturalism”19).
The next proposed interpretation is “that traditional prob-
lems of epistemology can be resolved by the natural sciences of 
cognition”. Haack suggests that there are two possible ways in 
this case: resolution of all problems or only some of them. The 
difference between the aforementioned interpretation and this one 
is relevant: scientific proposals now not only support philosophical 
research, but instead they replace such traditional methodology in 
epistemology. Although even if accepted, this way does not imply 
the necessity of such a replacement, it is one possible way of mak-
ing epistemology. “Traditional” epistemology is not to be denied, 
hence this naturalization may be named as Haack does, “reformist, 
scientistic naturalism”.20
The last interpretation is the most revolutionary,21 because 
it states that traditional epistemic problems will be replaced by 
scientific problems due to their illegitimation or misconception. 
This position assumes a lack of epistemic value of philosophical 
discussions and postulates the rejection of classical methodology 
in epistemology. One can call this position the “full-blooded” 
naturalization or, according to Haack, “revolutionary scientific 
naturalism”.22 The reading of Quine may suggest that his position 
is this one; therefore, as previously signalized, such simplifying 
interpretation may be treated as not fully adequate.
It is not possible to evaluate either which of these modes of nat-
uralizing epistemology is the most appropriate or which is closest 
to Quine’s own philosophical view in the present brief paper. It 
19 S. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, op. cit., p. 119.
20 S. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, op. cit.
21 R. Ziemińska, Zwrot naturalistyczny we współczesnej epistemologii, op. cit.
22 S. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, op. cit., p. 119.
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is worth noting, however, that, from our current perspective, the 
third interpretation is simply trivial: concerning generally the rel-
evance of science in philosophy is, generally, beyond discussion 
(however, the character of such “relevance” is controversial). On 
the other hand, the third, revolutionary way of rebuilding episte-
mology seems to be too radical: the question of whether psychology 
(generally descriptive discipline) may be treated as a substitute 
for epistemology (whose character may be named as descriptively 
normative) is still relevant and Quine’s replies to Kim’s critique 
are under discussion.23 Also, Haack rejects this model, because, as 
she correctly notices:
two familiar epistemological questions, at least, […] cannot plau-
sibly be argued either to be illegitimate or to be resoluble by science 
[…]: the problem of induction and the problem of the epistemic status 
of science.24
Indeed, these problems are of a methodological (induction) and 
strictly philosophical (epistemic status) character and there is no 
science (neither psychology, nor neuroscience) that can replace 
philosophy in the traditional sense in analyzing these issues. 
When searching for the meaning of the naturalization of law, 
one can find positions that are analogical to these three views. 
They will be presented below:
2. Naturalization of law – possible explanations 
analogical to Haack’s interpretations of naturalized 
epistemology
In the contemporary discussions concerning the naturalistic 
approaches to the “legal science” and philosophy of law, three pre-
23 See, for instance: W. van Orman Quine, Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge 1990, 
p. 19.
24 S. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, op. cit., p. 131.
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sented ways of interpretation of Quine’s naturalized epistemology 
are insufficiently emphasized, especially in the paradigm of legal 
realism. Authors usually concentrate on the replacement model 
(e.g. Leiter, Greenberg), and, as a consequence, the two other pos-
sible ways of the understanding of naturalization are discounted. 
The main thesis of the present paper is that all three models, 
as posed by Haack, may be harnessed to explicate the different 
aspects of naturalistic approach to jurisprudence. The proposal of 
such an interpretation will be presented below.
2.1. The reformationist aposteriorist approach in law
As was previously stated, the interpretation of naturalization 
as an ascertainment that scientific theories may be relevant from 
the point of view of philosophical analysis of epistemological issues, 
some of which can be resolved by means of results from empirical 
sciences, is obviously uncontroversial and may be evaluated as 
moderate and partial naturalization.
What is interesting, a similar kind of naturalization is wide-
spread in law and is the only type commonly accepted. The thesis 
that scientific theories (of course, if the term “science” is under-
stood sensu largo – denoting also psychology and empirical social 
sciences) may be appropriable from the point of view of some cases 
when law is to be applied is a truism. Across Europe and in almost 
all democratic countries in the world there is a function of expert 
witnesses: persons who have gained knowledge in certain scientific 
discipline (e.g. psychology or medicine) and cooperate with judges 
in the criminal, civil or administrative proceedings. 
Their most prominent function may be observed during the 
criminal trials, when they de facto determinate the character of 
judicial sentence, by decision of whether the accused is of a sound 
mind, and, as a consequence, whether he or she is guilty or inno-
cent. Therefore, the meaning of the legal term “sanity” is founded 
on psychological knowledge. Hence, the legal problem linked to the 
criminal responsibility in a certain set of cases is to be solved using 
psychology (as well as neuroscience). 
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The role of expert witnesses and science in the interpretation 
of law may also be espied in civil proceedings. For example, if one 
party to the contract was unable to make some decisions mindfully 
(e.g. due to the disturbance of mental processes), it is legitimated 
to claim annulment of the contact. The judge will have to decide 
whether there are premises to the acceptation of such a claim. 
Lawyers are not prepared for such analyzes, so they are obliged 
to apply to experts for their opinion, which is a crucial element for 
the decision.
According to Art. 553 of the Polish code of civil procedure, in 
the legal case concerning disablement (deprivation of the capacity 
to perform acts in law), the person who is to be deprived of such 
a capacity must be examined by a medical doctor (a psychiatrist or 
a neurologist) and a psychologist who have to express their opin-
ions. These are extremely significant in the context of the decision 
of judges. 
One can obviously enumerate more examples of such “natur-
alization” of law, which are in some aspects similar to the 
naturalization of epistemology in the first purport. What is 
intriguing is that legal philosophers rarely notice this dimension 
of naturalism in law. On the other hand, it is limited to practical 
and procedural aspects of concrete cases and, therefore, is not 
particularly relevant from the philosophical point of view.
2.2. „Medium” model of naturalization
There is a different situation when we discuss the second, “me-
dium” model of naturalization, according to which some problems 
of the law can be resolved by the natural sciences. I propose not 
to limit such an attempt merely to practical aspects, as above. On 
the contrary, such a model may be relevant particularly from the 
perspective of legal philosophy. Additionally, it is in accordance to 
“naturalization-as-coherence” proposal mentioned in the introduc-
tion. These two issues will now be presented.
One of the crucial problems in legal philosophy is the question 
about the character of the normativity of the law. It is worth 
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pointing out that one can find at least two ways of philosophical 
investigations of this feature of the law. Since the nineteenth cen-
tury (and also earlier), legal scholars have been responding to this 
question in various ways. 
Representatives of legal positivism have expressed antinatu­
ralistic opinions that the law has its obligatory power because it 
is made by people who have power and influence in society. Such 
a conception, presented by Austin25 in his command theory, may 
be found in many forms in the beliefs of many contemporary prom-
inent positivists. Perhaps the most radical representative of the 
positivistic “paradigm” is Hans Kelsen (the father of normativism), 
who aimed at the separation of law from descriptive disciplines (not 
only science, but also sociology), claiming that, from the legal point 
of view, merely the sphere of obligation (Sollen) may be treated as 
relevant.26 With regards to naturalization, such an attitude may 
be called a “separationist model”. In light of these propositions, 
science can play no role in the discussions concerning basic legal 
institutions and philosophical problems of the law.
The second way is to try to apply some scientific theories to the 
philosophical inquiries into the nature of legal normativity. Such 
disciplines as evolutionary psychology, primatology or neurosci-
ence offer interpretations of some facts in a new light. It is possible 
to do research directed towards the attainment of such knowledge, 
gained through these disciplines, in the area of the methodology 
of the utilization of the findings of the empirical sciences in the 
study of law.
Such studies are becoming an important part of contemporary 
legal philosophy and may be helpful in the explication of the char-
acter of the normativity of law and the cause of the existence of 
legal obligations. Furthermore, in construing such scientific-philo-
sophical models the propositions of legal positivists may paradox-
ically be treated as important points of view and, therefore, are 
not treated as misguided or simply senseless. Such “naturalized 
25 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, London 1832.
26 H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley–Los Angeles (CA) 1967.
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philosophy of law” is still philosophy, which cannot be replaced by 
any scientific discipline or even theory.
One should also note that the “medium” model of naturalization 
may be treated as an interpretation of attempts in legal philosophy 
which may be called “naturalization – as – coherence”. It may 
be interpreted as follows: law is naturalized to such an extent to 
which its descriptive presuppositions (in particular, these presup-
positions which are formulated by the representatives of dogmatics 
and judicature) are coherent with scientific knowledge in the logi-
cal sense.27
Some similarities to the first interpretation may be noticed, but 
in this case there is no simple “use” of some scientific theories in 
the process of legal practice, but, rather, a philosophical program 
aiming at the naturalization of law in the “medium” sense. Law 
and legal philosophy do not cease to be autonomous disciplines, but 
some complex problems may be rethought thanks to psychology, 
neuroscience and many other branches of scientific knowledge. The 
analogy to the medium interpretation of naturalized epistemology 
seems to be adequate in this context.
2.3. Replacement – radical model of naturalized jurisprudence
The two aforementioned models may be evaluated as being 
moderate: although the methodological autonomy of law and legal 
philosophy is maintained, the role of science cannot be neglected. 
Such a cooperation may be evaluated as beneficial and, sometimes, 
as necessary.
It does not mean, however, these two models are the only ones 
possible. The situation within legal philosophy seems to be com-
pletely different. The discussion concerning naturalism in juris-
prudence often is limited to various forms of legal realism.28 One 
27 See: B. Brożek, O naturalizacji prawa, op. cit., pp. 44–47.
28 About naturalization from this perspective I have written in: M. Jakubiec, 
On the relation between philosophy of science and jurisprudence in the context of the 
naturalization of law (paper originally published in Polish under the title: O relac­
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can find at least two reasons for such a state of opinions. Firstly, 
the dominant interpretation of naturalized epistemology, which is 
thought to be a paradigmatic way for the naturalization of other 
disciplines, is the most radical: psychology replaces epistemology. 
The literal reading of Quine may suggest such an understanding, 
but, as was previously presented, it is not the only (and even not 
the main) way of “naturalizing epistemology”. Consequently, 
the naturalization of law is not equivalent to the replacement of 
legal theory or philosophy by psychology. On the margin, “full” 
replacement is hard to imagine, due to, among others, prescriptive 
character of law.
Nevertheless, such attempts were made in legal philosophy and 
one example is Brian Leiter’s conception of naturalized jurispru-
dence. Leiter refers to American legal realism; therefore, there 
is a need to encapsulate main thesis of the realists. It should be 
acknowledged that American realism was not the only such move-
ment in legal theory in the twentieth century. No less interesting 
were Scandinavian realism and the psychological conception of 
Leon Petrażycki. Hence, these conceptions will be briefly presented 
below and then it will be said why models of radical naturalization 
may be connected with them, especially with American realism.
2.3.1. Main variants of legal realism
It was Oliver Holmes who initiated the American realist move-
ment, known to be more pragmatic than philosophical (perhaps, as 
will be posed later, wrongly). In his famous “The Path of the Law”, 
he depicted a proposal different from any previous conceptions of 
law. He stated:
When we study law, we are not studying a mystery but a well-
known profession. We are studying what we shall want in order to 
appear before judges, or to advise people in such a way as to keep them 
ji pomiędzy filozofią nauki a jurysprudencją w kontekście problematyki naturalizacji 
prawa, „Logos i Ethos 2 (2014), pp. 137–152.
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out of court […]. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the pre-
diction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality 
of the courts.29
Such a controversial declaration implies that the methodology 
of legal science (and also legal philosophy) is to be changed. In-
stead of the conceptual analysis or different linguistic methods, 
the method of jurisprudence is to predict the future behavior of 
judges. The law is what judges really do in courts and the legal 
science must be based on such a predictive method. Consequently, 
law is reducible to the mental sphere of people executing the “law 
in books” and de facto becomes a descriptive discipline30. 
A different approach was represented in Leon Petrażycki’s 
writings. According to his psychological approach, the law is not 
the result of the process of legislation, but rather a set of mental 
processes, in particular emotions. Investigation into the nature of 
law requires the analysis of these processes, especially attributive 
emotions; therefore, disciplines like psychology or biology become 
an immanent part of legal science.31 
The similar naturalistic approach was presented by Scand-
inavian legal realists, a group of philosophers involved in Axel 
Hagerstrom’s project of positivistic rejection of metaphysics in 
philosophy and jurisprudence. A radical approach to the analysis 
of language led them to reflect on the character of legal concepts, 
the methodology of jurisprudence and the role of law in society. 
One of the main theses of Vienna Circle philosophers was the veri-
ficationist theory of meaning: the meaning of a sentence is the method 
of its empirical verification. Therefore, the sentences that cannot be 
verified in such way are senseless. Metaphysical statements, as a phil-
osophical discipline that aims at answering basic questions concerning 
the problems of entity, the character of whole reality etc., cannot be 
confronted with experience; hence, they are just linguistic excess. The 
29 O. Holmes, The Path of The Law, „Harvard Law Review” 10 (1897) 8, p. 457.
30 M. Jakubiec, O relacji..., op. cit., pp. 139–140.
31 L. Petrażycki, O nauce prawa i moralności. Pisma wybrane, Warszawa 1985, p. 175.
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same problem is linked to legal concepts, which are not of empirical 
origin.32 The essence of jurisprudence, therefore, is not the investigation 
of the legal regulations’ character through, for instance, linguistic anal-
ysis, but rather the explication of facts linked to the functioning of legal 
imperatives. The philosophical analysis within jurisprudence is to be 
focused on the investigation of present and future feelings of citizens (in 
particular judges); the only “reality” which can be recognized as related 
to legal concepts is the mental one (and, in the materialistic perspective 
strictly empirical). Therefrom the methods of psychology and other 
sciences exploring human mental processes become strictly relevant 
from the viewpoint of philosophy of law, or these sciences are to replace 
law and legal philosophy.33 The interpretation of Scandinavian realism 
depends on some detailed issues. Unfortunately, nowadays this move-
ment is evaluated as anachronistic, and perhaps due to such opinion 
discussions regarding realistic models of naturalization are centered on 
American legal realism. Brian Leiter initiated such debate. In the fol-
lowing part of the paper, I would like to present a few selected aspects 
of Leiter’s interpretation of American realism as a replacement model 
of naturalizing jurisprudence and the critique addressed to his ideas. 
It is worth noting here that one will find no resounding dec-
larations of “naturalization of law” in the publications of the 
aforementioned lawyers. The interpretation of their approaches as 
naturalistic is in part the effect of pursuance to naturalize different 
disciplines, as popularized by Quine.
2.3.2. American realism and replacement naturalism according to B. Leiter
In recent years, an attempt to use realistic methodology for cre-
ating a model of naturalizing jurisprudence was made by Leiter.34 
32 See: M. Jakubiec, Tû­Tû Alfa Rossa a tezy skandynawskiego realizmu praw­
nego, [in:] Naturalizm prawniczy. Stanowiska, ed. J. Stelmach et al., Warszawa 
2015, pp. 201–220.
33 M. Jakubiec, O relacji pomiędzy filozofią nauki a jurysprudencją…, op. cit., 
p. 141–142.
34 B. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 
“Texas Law Review” 76 (1997) 2, pp. 267–315.
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In several publications, a philosopher tried to interpret the natu-
ralization of law (he interpreted naturalism broadly: he included 
not only psychology and natural sciences, but also social sciences35 
in the catalogue of relevant disciplines) in the context of disputes 
about the character of law canvassed between American realists. He 
criticized many interpretations of realism, including those of Dwor-
kin and Hart, and claimed the need of “rethinking legal realism”.36 
As he sees it, “realism remains a joke, viewed simply as a movement 
that appealed to philosophically superficial lawyers, but which made 
no substantial contribution to philosophical thinking about law”37 
within Anglo-American jurisprudence. In continental Europe, the 
situation is no better: “outside Anglo-American jurisprudence, legal 
theorists have selectively represented – or simply misrepresent-
ed – realism, and in ways that do not bode well for understanding 
the realists as offering anything to a philosophical theory of law”.38
Indeed, as already has been expressed, American realism is 
evaluated as simple pragmatism rather than as a sophisticated 
legal philosophy. One of the many reasons for such an opinion may 
be that Holmes, Frank, Lewellyn and others did not create any 
“philosophical school” as, for instance, the Scandinavian realists 
did. Nevertheless, Leiter tries to picture American realism and, par-
ticularly, predictive theory of law as relevant from the philosophical 
point of view. On the other hand, realistic perspective has domina-
ted American thinking about law and legal culture, but this kind of 
influence is absent from the field of legal philosophy. Leiter’s aim is 
to change the situation.39 He wants to explicate both the pragmatic 
and the naturalistic sides of realism, which are necessary in the 
predictive theory and are linked in the specific way:
35 B. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, op. cit., p. 285 (this paper is also 
re-printed in Leiter’s book Naturalizing Jurisprudence, Oxford 2007, pp. 16–59 
(chapter one).
36 B. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, op. cit., p. 266–267.
37 B. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, op. cit., p. 274.
38 B. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, op. cit., p. 274.
39 B. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, op. cit., pp. 274.
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To predict reliably and effectively what courts will do one should 
know what causes courts to decide as they do. The causes of judicial 
decision, in turn, are only available to the sort of empirical inquiry 
modeled on the natural and social sciences that the realists advocate. 
A naturalistic theory of adjudication, then, must produce a pragmat-
ically valuable theory for lawyers, i.e., one that will enable them to 
predict what courts will do.40
The crucial part of jurisprudence is to be naturalized in order 
to be epistemically valuable. Alternative methodology will not lead 
to appropriate conclusions (for instance mistaken “indeterminate 
normative theory”). Therefore, the two main aspects of the “rad-
ical naturalization” of epistemology may be found (by analogy) in 
Leiter’s interpretation of realism as the naturalization of law: first, 
the evaluation of non-naturalistic methods as mistaken and lead-
ing to misconceptions and, second, the emphasis on the necessity of 
application the naturalistic methodology. As he writes:
The Realists […] take the […] step that Quine takes: replacement. 
According to the Realist indeterminacy thesis, legal reasons do not 
justify a unique decision, meaning that the foundationalist enterprise 
of theory of adjudication is impossible. Why not replace, then, the 
“sterile” foundational program of justifying some one legal outcome on 
the basis of the applicable legal reasons, with a descriptive/explanatory 
account of what input (that is, what combination of facts and reasons) 
produces what output (i.e., what judicial decision)?41
The replacement concerns then not the whole of law and legal 
philosophy, but rather the theory of adjudication. On the other 
hand, however, this theory is the basis for the whole American 
realists’ “jurisprudence” (whatever this term may mean in such 
40 B. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, op. cit., p. 286.
41 B. Leiter, Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, [in:] Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-naturalism 
(30.03.2015).
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context). Such a position may seem to be highly controversial, 
but Leiter remarks in the following way: the theory created in 
the non-naturalistic way will be always worse than one based on 
natural and social sciences. He is aware that:
This response, of course, makes Replacement Naturalism vulnera-
ble to conflicting intuitions about the fruitfulness or sterility of different 
kinds of theorizing.42
The issue of the normativity of law (even “law in books”) and 
the character of the relation between legislature and courts are 
problems, which probably cannot be solved in such perspective.
Leiter’s motivation is similar to Quine’s with regards to episte-
mology if the essay “Epistemology Naturalized” is read literally: the 
problems of foundationalism (although differently interpreted) are 
the point of departure in formulating the naturalistic, appropriate 
methodology. The foundationalism in law is based on the following 
belief: legal reasons justify unique decisions. Realists rejected such 
view, claiming, as Leiter interpreted their opinion:
that the law is rationally indeterminate in the sense that the class 
of legal reasons—i.e., the class of legitimate reasons a judge may offer 
for a decision—does not provide a justification for a unique outcome. 
Just as sensory input does not justify a unique scientific theory, so le-
gal reasons, according to the Realists, do not justify a unique decision.
Such opinion is the main source of Leiter’s belief that “legal 
science” and the philosophy of law is to be replaced with a causal/
nomological explanation of how judges decide cases. We should 
then abandon the philosophy of law and turn instead to psychology 
and sociology.43
42 B. Leiter, Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, op. cit.
43 M. Greenberg, Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law, „Law 
and Philosophy” 30 (2011) 4, p. 424.
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Leter’s way of naturalizing the law is questionable for many 
reasons. 
First of all, it is doubtful whether such a naturalistic approach 
can be ascribed to all American realists (for instance, Underhill 
Moore certainly was naturalistically-oriented, but there is a ques-
tion concerning other representatives of realistic thinking). Legal 
scholars like Holmes, Frank or Llewellyn and many others all 
represented different styles of reflection and did not create any 
“philosophical school of realism”, as the Scandinavians did, for 
instance. These facts raise the mentioned question.
Secondly, Leiter’s conception is based on a “radical” reading 
of Quine, which, as has been stated many times, is not the only 
possible on, and perhaps is not a fully adequate interpretation.
Eventually, there is the question whether “naturalized epis-
temology” can be seen as a model for naturalized law. According 
to Greenberg, “naturalized epistemology provides no rationale for 
the naturalization of philosophy of law”.44 There is no place here 
to present Greenberg’s argumentation; what is worth noting is 
that his critical approach seems to be valid merely in the case of 
a radical reading of Quine. 
Conclusion: which model is acceptable?
Leiter’s proposal is based on one interpretation of naturalization. 
Of course, simply rejecting “classical” jurisprudence and replacing 
it with another discipline is impossible; one can only naturalize 
parts of “legal science” and of the philosophy of law. Due to this 
fact, if Quine’s proposal read as replacing epistemology by psychol-
ogy it cannot be useful for legal philosophy as strict analogy.
The other possible interpretations of epistemology naturaliza-
tion briefly presented in the previous paragraphs seem to be basis 
for models of naturalization of law. According to the first model, 
44 M. Greenberg, Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law, op. 
cit., p. 451.
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functioning of the expert witnesses may be treated as naturaliza-
tion in the moderate aposterioric sense. The philosophy of law that 
is done in accordance with the scientific theories concerning e.g. 
the nature of human normative systems or the project of natural-
ization-as-coherence were interpreted as moderate naturalization 
of law, justified and valuable. The model of replacement and its 
example, which is Leiter’s interpretation of realism, is dubious and 
is not “full” realism, which cannot be achieved within law. There-
fore such models are to be treated as conceptions that fall into the 
second presented interpretation of naturalized law.
Summary 
Interpretations of Quine’s naturalized epistemology and the 
character of the naturalization of law 
Quine’s project of “naturalized epistemology” is usually interpreted as a re-
jection of classical epistemology, which becomes merely a “chapter of psycho-
logy”. It does not imply, however, a different understanding of the character 
of naturalization is inadequate or wrong. Susan Haack’s interpretations are 
briefly analyzed in the paper. Thereafter, they are harnessed as models of in-
terpretation of the “naturalization of law”. The main aim is to point the radical 
reading of Quine’s project (the replacement model) is not the only acceptable 
one. Consequently, there are at least three models of the “naturalization of 
law” that are analogical to the “naturalization of epistemology”. The author 
details their character.
Keywords Quine, naturalization, epistemology, law, jurisprudence, naturali-
zation of law.
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